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Abstract
This paper analyzes consumers’ privacy choice concerning their private data and firms’
ensuing pricing strategy. The General Data Protection Regulation passed by the Euro-
pean Union in May 2018 allows consumers to decide whether to reveal private informa-
tion in the form of cookies to an online seller. By incorporating this endogenous decision
into a duopoly model with behavior-based pricing, we find two contrasting equilibria.
Under revelation to both firms, consumers disclose their information. Under revelation
to only one firm, consumers hide their information. Based on the model, we design a
laboratory experiment. We find that there is a large share of consumers who reveal
their private data. Particularly, less privacy-concerned subjects and subjects in the
setting where only one firm receives information are more likely to reveal information.
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1 Introduction
Behavior-based price discrimination is a topic that has been widely discussed. As an exam-
ple for behavior-based pricing, take an experiment Amazon ran in 2000. The online retailer
tested its DVD pricing strategy: they set different prices for new customers, regular cus-
tomers and product-loyal customers (i.e., customers who had already bought the very same
DVD). Amazon used information on buyers’ past purchases to discriminate between old and
new customers. This was the first major web test of behavior-based pricing. The web test
was followed by outrage due to the perceived violation of privacy (Streitfeld, 2000). More
recent examples of discrimination between registered and new customers are Netflix’s and
Amazon Prime’s offer of trial months to new customers. Odlyzko (2003) and Tucker (2012)
show that the strategy of behavior-based pricing and personalized advertizing has spread
across internet retailers.
Since Amazon’s experiment a lot has changed in the field of data protection and privacy.
Particularly, the passing of EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in May of
2018 was a major break-through for privacy protection. In accordance with the regulation,
consumers can now decide whether to allow websites to access their personal information
contained in cookies. The information included are past purchases, search history, personal
data and more. Online retailers use the data to make personalized offers in line with behavior-
based pricing. Thus, with the GDPR, consumers have the power to act strategically in their
cookie choice. 1 By electing to deny cookies, consumers stay anonymous to firms and cannot
be identified as old customers. Conversely, when consumers allow a firm to access their
cookies, they can be identified and targeted with customized prices.
In this paper we extend a standard model of behavior-based pricing (Fudenberg and
Tirole, 2000) by including consumers’ choices whether to allow cookies based on the concept
of the GDPR. Within our novel model, we focus on how consumers react strategically to
behavior-based pricing when privacy is endogenized, and how sellers’ pricing strategy changes
accordingly. We explore the research questions from two different angles: firstly, we solve our
model theoretically and secondly, we test the resulting equilibria in a laboratory experiment.
In both our analyses, we build on the Hotelling (1929) model with two competitive firms
and a continuum of consumers distributed along a straight line. We consider a two-period
game, where a consumer buys one unit of a product in each period from one of the firms.
In the first stage of the theoretical model, firms set identical prices for all consumers with
no information about consumers’ preferences. At this point, consumers decide from which
firm to buy and whether to reveal their cookies. In the second stage, based on consumers’
1Throughout this paper we use the term “cookie” to refer to information about past purchases.
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privacy strategy, firms set different prices and consumers, again, decide where to buy. The
GDPR provides a good frame for analyzing consumers’ endogenous choice.
In the theoretical analysis, we find that the optimal pricing strategy is a mixture of uni-
form pricing and standard behavior-based pricing (Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000). Depending
on the firms’ targetability of the competitor’s consumers, we define different information set-
tings and find opposing equilibria for consumer strategies. In the complete information case,
when consumers’ data is available to both competitors, consumers are best-off by giving up
their privacy, in order to increase competition between sellers. In the incomplete informa-
tion case, when consumers’ data is only available to the respective firm they bought from,
consumers are best-off by maintaining their privacy. Both equilibria are obtained under a
pooling assumption. The more general case lies between the two extreme cases of complete
and incomplete information. Here, sellers can target a random share of their competitor’s
consumers. In the general case, no pooling equilibrium exists.
To test the theoretical predictions, we design a controlled laboratory experiment. We re-
late measures of iterative reasoning and privacy concerns with behavior in a stylized market
environment that closely resembles our theoretical model. With this approach, we investigate
whether subjects act according to our predictions of full information disclosure in the com-
plete information treatment and full information concealment in the incomplete information
treatment.
In the experiment, we find that a lot of the consumers allow tracking of their past
purchase, however, they are less likely to do so over time as well as when they are more
concerned about privacy. Also, given only the firm consumers have bought from has access
to consumer’s information, subjects are initially more willing to reveal their data.
The literature on behavior-based pricing considers different aspects of consumer’s decision
about their privacy. The paper that is closest to ours analyzes consumers who can be
tracked based on their past purchases in a monopoly (Conitzer et al., 2012). Other papers
are concerned with a secondary market for consumer data (Casadesus-Masanell and Hervas-
Drane, 2015; Taylor, 2004). Colombo (2016) and Esteves (2014) each take a look at an
exogenous share of anonymous consumers, but do not consider an endogenous consumer
decision.
Literature combining a theoretical analysis of behavior-based pricing with experimental
evidence is scarce. Brokesova et al. (2014) experimentally test theoretical predictions of
Chen and Pearcy (2010) concerning the role of price commitment and stochastic preferences
for BBPD in an experiment with computerized buyers. Mahmood (2014) implements a
model by Shin and Sudhir (2010) to analyze the impact of heterogeneous buyers, though the
experimental approach is more akin to a differentiated products Bertrand competition than
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to the spatial competition of the underlying theory.
We contribute to the literature by focusing on consumers’ endogenous privacy decisions
in competitive markets under a set of different information schemes. Combining a theoretical
model with an experiment to answer the research questions is a novel approach to such a
problem.
2 Literature Review
In the theoretical literature, the paper closest to our work is Conitzer et al. (2012). They
study a monopoly with an outside option and consumers who can choose to let the monopolist
track their purchases. As in our paper, consumers have an endogenous privacy choice.
However, Conitzer et al. (2012) do not study a competitive situation of behavior-based
pricing, where the strategic action of consumers has different implications for pricing. Our
focus is on consumers’ privacy choice for different information settings, in which we diverge
from the theoretical analysis of Conitzer et al. (2012). Acquisti and Varian (2005) also look
at a monopoly with endogenous privacy choice and analyze the situation from a mechanism
design perspective. In an extension they look at a competitive setting with a large number of
firms under incomplete information between firms. Montes et al. (2018) consider a duopoly
with a costly privacy choice for consumers. They focus on a data broker who sells consumers’
data to competing firms. One of their main results is that information is usually only sold
to one of the firms.
Another important paper is by Colombo (2016). He considers a set-up of incomplete
information sharing in a duopoly case similar to our incomplete information case (in Section
4.2). Colombo uses a fixed parameter as share of anonymous consumers and does not consider
consumers’ endogenous privacy choice. The main point of our study, however, is to analyze
the strategic decision of consumers.
There is a literature that connects firms to a secondary market of consumer information.
In Casadesus-Masanell and Hervas-Drane (2015) sellers derive profit from buyers’ purchases
as well as from a secondary market where consumers’ information can be disclosed. The
decision of consumers to reveal information plays a twofold role here. The authors find that
the profit maximizing strategy of firms is to focus on the consumer market. Taylor (2004)
studies a model with two monopolists and horizontal product differentiation. Consumers’
demands for the goods are positively correlated, therefore, each purchase contains valuable
information for both monopolists. Taylor compares a non-disclosure to a full disclosure
regime where firms can exchange information about consumers.
Other papers have looked at the quality of information in a spatial competition setting
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(Esteves, 2014; Liu and Serfes, 2004) but do not look at consumers’ privacy decision instead
they use an exogenous parameter.
Extensive reviews of the literature on behavior-based price discrimination in general can
be found in Armstrong (2006); Esteves et al. (2009); Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2006).
The analysis of behavior-based pricing under endogenous privacy in the experiment re-
lates to two branches of experimental literature. Firstly, the basic structure and procedure is
related to spatial competition experiments. We extend the existing literature on BBPD and
spatial competition with location choice experiments. BBPD experiments have been con-
ducted by Brokesova et al. (2014) and Mahmood (2014). Brokesova et al. (2014) computerize
the buyers side, which we do not. Mahmood (2014) only considers two fixed locations for
buyers, whereby the experimental market rather resembles a Bertrand market with differ-
entiated products than a spatial competition. We employ a BBPD experiment similar to
those two but introduce features from spatial competition with location choice experiments
by Camacho-Cuena et al. (2005) and Barreda-Tarrazona et al. (2011).
Secondly, we introduce privacy and data sharing elements. Similar issues have been stud-
ied before, but to our knowledge not in context of an explicit market experiment. Acquisti
et al. (2013) identify a considerable gap between willingness to accept disclosure of private
information and willingness to pay for the protection of private information. To alleviate this
issue we renounce enforcing a default option on privacy, assuming disclosure and protection
are both costless. Beresford et al. (2012); Preibusch et al. (2013) find that subjects have a
remarkably low willingness-to-accept for giving up their privacy and are not acting on their
stated privacy decisions when protection of privacy is costless. However, this finding con-
trasts Tsai et al. (2011) who find that subjects act on websites’ certified privacy protection
qualities when shopping online. They suggest that subjects might in fact be willing to pay
premiums for privacy protection. Schudy and Utikal (2017) find that subjects’ willingness
to share personal information decreases when the number of recipients of said information
increases. Feri et al. (2016) explore in a lab setting how privacy disclosure is affected by
risks of privacy shock in the form of data breaches. They find that only those consumers,
who regard their information as sensitive, demonstrate an effect on information disclosure
under different likelihoods of data breaches.
3 Model
We consider a set-up following Hotelling (1929), where a line segment of length θ¯ spans a
product characteristic space. Along the line, consumers are uniformly distributed with a
density of θ¯−1, i.e., we assume a consumer mass of 1. The location of a consumer is private
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knowledge to them and denoted by θ ∈ [0, θ¯], such that θ serves as a consumer’s preferred
variety of a good. The further away from the produced variety a consumer is located, the
lower is their utility. Consumers’ locations can also be interpreted as their type.
There are two firms each producing a variant of the same good at constant marginal
costs k, which are normalized to zero; fixed costs are neglected. Firm A is located at the left
end of the line segment, while firm B is placed at the right end. The firms compete for two
periods, t = 1, 2, which we also refer to as stages.
In each period, consumers buy one unit of the good either from firm A or B, i.e., we
assume that the valuation of the product is large enough to make sure each consumer buys
one unit in each stage and no outside option is available. Considering a consumer located
at θˆ, their utility is given by UA = v − pa − θˆ or UB = v − pb − (θ¯ − θˆ), depending on their
purchasing decision. We assume consumers’ unit transportation cost to be normalized to 1.
Consumers’ valuations, v, are the same over time for all consumers.
On top of the purchasing decisions, consumers also decide whether to accept the use of
cookies, q ∈ {0, 1}, in the first period. We use cookies as proxy for a consumer’s purchasing
history, which is revealed to a company if q = 1. In that case, a firm is able to identify a buyer
from period t = 1 and can thus set a different price in the upcoming period. Consumers have
the option to act strategically with regards to revealing information. In the literature it is
often assumed that such a privacy choice involves some costs (Conitzer et al., 2012; Montes
et al., 2018). We refrain from such an assumption to keep the predictions for the experiment
clean from any cost effects and not impose an implicit privacy concern on subjects in the
experiment. Consumer’s rationale is to maximize their utility. We do not take discounting
into account.
In t = 1 competing firms set prices p1 = (pA1 , pB1 ). In the second period pricing is
more involved. Depending on the preceding cookie choice of consumers there is a share λ
of anonymous customers who forbade the use of their cookies and a share 1− λ of identifi-
able customers. These shares are essentially derived from consumers’ choice regarding their
cookies.
Given the cookie choice of a consumer, we differentiate between a continuum of informa-
tion settings. The information settings differ according to the value of a parameter β ∈ [0, 1].
Simply speaking, β is a firms’ targetability 2 of their competitor’s turf in the second stage.
That means, in the second stage each firm can randomly target a β share of its competitor’s
consumers who chose to reveal information in the first stage. To clarify β, consider the
two extreme cases β = 0 and β = 1. When β = 0, firms cannot target their competitors’
consumers. In this incomplete information setting, accepting the use of cookies, means that
2Chen et al. (2001) provide an extensive analysis of imperfect targetability in marketing.
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only the firm a consumer has bought from can access information about a consumer’s past
purchase (contained in the cookie). When β = 1, firms can target all their competitor’s
consumers who chose to reveal their cookies. In this complete information setting, accepting
the use of cookies, means that both firms can access the information about a consumer’s past
purchase (contained in the cookie). For any β ∈ (0, 1) we formulate a general case where
only a share β can be targeted by the competitor.
In the complete information setting, where both firms can target the competitors’ con-
sumers, each distinguishes three prices in the second stage: pi2,i, is a loyalty price for con-
sumers who bought from firm i in the first stage and decide to buy from the same firm in the
second stage; pj2,i, is a poaching price for identifiable consumers who bought from i in the
first period and j in the second period; and pi2, is an anonymous price for consumers who
belong to the share λ, where i, j = A,B and i 6= j. The idea of poaching consumers was
first explored in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000). In Section 4.2, we diverge from the complete
information setting and assume that only firms that consumers have bought from in the first
period can learn about the purchasing history. This alters the pricing strategy since firms can
no longer set a poaching price pj2,i, because the information needed is not available to them.
The case for β ∈ (0, 1) is a mixture of the two extreme cases. Depending on consumer’s loca-
tion, consumers who revealed information, face a poaching price pj2,i with probability β and
with probability 1−β the anonymous price pi2 from the competitor. Therefore, firms cannot
commit to not use the information they obtain about consumers’ first-period purchases.
At the beginning of the game β is randomly drawn and common knowledge. Each con-
sumer privately learns their type θ. Then in the first period, firms set prices p1. Afterward,
consumers simultaneously make their purchasing decision, b1 ∈ {A,B} and their cookie
choice, q ∈ {0, 1}. In the second period, firms set prices p2 = (pi2,i, pi2, pj2,i), and then β
is realized. At the end of the second period consumers again choose to buy from A or B.
Finally, consumers receive their utilities and firms earn profits.
In our analysis we focus on determining equilibria where all consumers anonymize with
the same probability independent of their location. We solve for perfect Bayesian Nash
equilibria (PBE). In this context a PBE comprises a firm’s strategy (first and second period
prices given the information sets for each period 3), consumers’ strategy (first period purchase
and cookie choice as functions of the location and pi1, as well as second period purchase as
function of the location and second period prices) and the firms’ beliefs about consumers’
locations given their cookie choice. The firms’ beliefs correspond to the consumer mass within
segments of the Hotelling line. The segments are functions of the prices given consumers’
3The strategy should also contain second period prices if firms had set different prices in the first period.
This is omitted here for simplicity.
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privacy choices 4.
4 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section we determine the theoretical equilibria of the two-period game. We consider
three distinct information settings: firstly, we assume that information about previous pur-
chases is given to both firms, irrespective of the actual buying decision of consumers, i.e.,
β = 1. Secondly, we analyze the incomplete information case, where only the firm that a
consumer has bought from in t = 1 can access consumers’ cookies, i.e. β = 0. Lastly, we
explore the general case for β ∈ (0, 1), where consumers observe a poaching price pji with
probability β or put differently firms can target a random share of β consumers of their
competitor.
We focus on pooling equilibria, where each buyer has an identical probability to reveal
information independent of their location. In the extreme cases, we show that there is an
optimal pooling equilibrium where consumers’ cookie choices are in pure strategies. This
means that all consumers, independent of their type, make the same decision regarding their
cookies and λ ∈ {0, 1}. However, no pooling equilibrium exists in the general case.
4.1 Complete Information
In the complete information setting both firms receive information about a consumer’s pre-
vious purchase given the consumer decides to share their cookies. This means β = 1. In
a pooling equilibrium, we assume that with probability λ, a consumer decides to hide their
cookies, and with probability 1 − λ, to reveal their cookies.5 Consumers who did not let
firms access their cookies in the first stage, are anonymous to both firms and are treated
as new customers. Therefore, they face prices pA2 (pB2 ) from firm A (firm B) in the second
stage. Consumers who reveal information about the purchase in the first period, can be
recognized by firms and thus are offered different prices in the second stage, pA2,A (pB2,A) as
the prices offered by firm A (firm B) for those who bought from firm A in the first stage,
and pB2,B (pA2,B) as the prices provided by firm B (firm A) for those who bought from firm
B in the first stage. Under the GDPR such a situation can arise, since firms can choose to
share consumers’ data with a partner firm or a competitor, as long as they inform consumers
about the data transfer. In the literature there are several papers which consider a secondary
4The firms also have beliefs about the acions of anonymous consumers (whether they bought from A or
B), however, they do not affect the analysis.
5Notice that under a pooling equilibrium the share of anonymous consumers λ can also be interpreted
as probability.
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market for consumer data or a data broker (Casadesus-Masanell and Hervas-Drane, 2015;
Chen et al., 2001; Montes et al., 2018). In this literature a full revelation situation can also
arise.
The firms’ beliefs about consumers’ locations are given by the segmentation of the
Hotelling line. We divide consumers by their privacy choice into identifiable and anony-
mous consumers and can therefore consider two separated Hotelling lines. On the Hotelling
line of consumers who did not share their purchase from the first period, there will be a
mass of λ consumers. Firms segment this line by a marginal consumer θ2 who is indifferent
between buying from firm A and firm B. θ2 is determined by v− pA2 − θ2 = v− pB2 − (θ¯− θ2)
as
θ2 =
θ¯
2
+
pB2 − pA2
2
.
Therefore, firms believe that consumers with location θ ∈ [0, θ2) buy from firm A in the
second period given they anonymized. Similarly, consumers with θ ∈ (θ2, θ¯] buy from firm
B.
The maximization problem of the firms on this Hotelling line are given by:
max
pA2
λpA2
[
θ¯
2
+
pB2 − pA2
2
]
max
pB2
λpB2
[
θ¯ − ( θ¯
2
+
pB2 − pA2
2
)
]
.
We can derive the first-order conditions as
θ¯
2
+
pB2
2
− pA2 = 0
θ¯
2
− pB2 +
pA2
2
= 0
and we obtain the anonymous prices pA2 = pB2 = θ¯ and the marginal consumer, θ2 =
θ¯
2
.
The other Hotelling line has a mass of 1 − λ consumers who revealed their data in the
first stage. They are confronted with behavior-based price discrimination. Among the mass
of 1− λ consumers, those who bought from firm A in the first stage are given two prices in
the second period: pA2,A as a loyal-customer price set by firm A and pB2,A as a poaching price
from firm B. Similarly, considering consumers who bought from firm B in the first stage
also face two prices now, pB2,B as a loyal-customer price from firm B, and pA2,B as a poaching
price from firm A.
Firms’ beliefs lead to two segments on this Hotelling line. There is a marginal consumer
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characterized by v − pA2,A − θA2 = v − pB2,A − (θ¯ − θA2 ), which is equivalent to
θA2 =
θ¯
2
+
pB2,A − pA2,A
2
.
Accordingly, the marginal customer θB2 is determined by v− pA2,B − θB2 = v− pB2,B − (θ¯− θB2 ),
which gives
θB2 =
θ¯
2
+
pB2,B − pA2,B
2
.
This means, firms believe that identified consumers with θ ∈ [0, θA2 ) and θ ∈ (θB2 , θ¯] are
loyal to their first-period sellers. Whereas, consumers at θ ∈ (θA2 , θ1) and θ ∈ (θ1, θB2 ) are
poached by the competitor firm, where θ1 denotes the first-period marginal consumer who
is indifferent between buying from A and B.
Figure 1 depicts the beliefs/consumer shares and respective pricing by spanning a rect-
angle over both Hotelling lines connected vertically through the share λ.
0
Firm A
θ¯
Firm B
θ1θ
A
2
θB
2
θ2
1
λ
pA
2,A p
B
2,A p
A
2,B p
B
2,B
pA
2
pB
2
Figure 1: Customer segments under complete information
For the the Hotelling line with consumer mass 1−λ, we have the following maximization
problems:
max
pA2,A,p
A
2,B
(1− λ) [pA2,AθA2 + pA2,B(θB2 − θ1)]
max
pB2,B ,p
B
2,A
(1− λ) [pB2,B(θ¯ − θB2 ) + pB2,A(θ1 − θA2 )]
By plugging θA2 and θB2 into these two equations, we can solve for the prices.
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Lemma 1 The set of prices in the second stage depend on θ1(p1) and the parameter θ¯. For
firm A the anonymous, the loyalty and the poaching prices are:
pA2 = θ¯ p
A
2,A =
1
3
(2θ1 + θ¯)
pA2,B =
1
3
(3θ¯ − 4θ1)
Accordingly, for firm B the prices are given by:
pB2 = θ¯ p
B
2,B =
1
3
(3θ¯ − 2θ1)
pB2,A =
1
3
(4θ1 − θ¯)
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 1 shows that if a customer chooses not to share their information in the first stage,
they will face uniform pricing in the second stage. However, if they reveal information in
the first stage, they will be confronted with behavior-based prices, including poaching prices
offered by the competitive firm in the second stage. Lemma 1 demonstrates that prices are
independent of λ.
When we move to the first stage, we need to think about the consumers’ endogenous
decisions about their cookies. By comparing the prices for anonymous consumers with the
two prices for recognized buyers we can show that prices as anonymous customer are always
higher, such that consumers can strategically choose to share their purchasing history, in
order to receive lower prices in the second stage. This means the probability to hide cookies
is zero and thus the mass λ of consumers on the anonymous Hotelling line is also zero.
Next we consider price setting of both firms in the first period. Similar to the second
stage, there are two separated Hotelling lines in the first stage. For the line of consumers
who did not share their cookies, there is a cut-off customer θˆ1, who, in the first period, is
indifferent between buying from firm A at pA1 and buying from firm B at pB1 6, is determined
by
v − pA1 − θˆ1 = v − pB1 − (θ¯ − θˆ1)
where we can easily get that θˆ1 = θ¯2 +
1
2
(pB1 − pA1 ).
On the other hand, on the line of those who shared their cookies in the first stage, the
6θˆ1 is not influenced by the prices in the second stage, since the share of those who did not disclose their
information is λ, and the two firms will maximize their profits by choosing pA2 and pB2 which are independent
of the first stage.
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marginal customer, θ1, is defined by the following equivalence,
v − pA1 − θ1 +
[
v − pB2,A − (θ¯ − θ1)
]
= v − pB1 − (θ¯ − θ1) +
[
v − pA2,B − θ1
]
The equation represents consumers indifferent between buying from firm A at pA1 in stage
one and afterward from firm B at pB2,A in stage two, and buying from firm B at pB1 in stage
one and then purchasing from firm A at pA2,B in stage two. Hence, the marginal consumer is
given by θ1 = θ¯2 +
3
8
(pB1 − pA1 ).
In the first stage firms maximize the overall profits, thus firm A’s problem is to maximize
the following term with respect to the first-period prices
piA = λpA1 θˆ1 + (1− λ)pA1 θ1 + λpA2 θ2 + (1− λ)
[
pA2,Aθ
A
2 + p
A
2,B(θ
B
2 − θ1)
]
.
Similarly, firm B maximizes
piB = λpB1 (θ¯− θˆ1) + (1−λ)pB1 (θ¯− θ1) +λpB2 (θ¯− θ2) + (1−λ)
[
pB2,A(θ1 − θA2 ) + pB2,B(θ¯ − θB2 )
]
.
From the second-stage analysis, we obtained pA2 = pB2 = θ¯ and θ2 =
θ¯
2
. Therefore the respec-
tive third terms in the profit functions do not affect the maximization problem. Inserting
pA2,A, pB2,A, pA2,B, pB2,B, and θ1 into the two maximization problems above we can derive the
two first-order conditions,
θ¯
2
+
3 + λ
8
pB1 −
3 + λ
4
pA1 −
5
16
(1− λ)(pB1 − pA1 ) = 0
θ¯
2
+
3 + λ
8
pA1 −
3 + λ
4
pB1 +
5
16
(1− λ)(pB1 − pA1 ) = 0
.
Proposition 1 The optimal prices under complete information for the competing firms in
both periods are
pA1 = p
B
1 =
4
3 + λ
θ¯
pA2,A = p
B
2,B =
2
3
θ¯
pA2,B = p
B
2,A =
1
3
θ¯
pA2 = p
B
2 = θ¯
Therefore, the marginal consumer in the first stage is located at θ1 = θ¯2 , and we have thus
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reached a symmetric PBE. The obtained PBE is characterized by a common consumer strat-
egy where λ = 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
From the results we can gather that given a consumer stays anonymous in the first period,
they face uniform pricing in the second period. Otherwise, they are confronted with price
discrimination, which leads to identical results as in standard behavior-based pricing (Fu-
denberg and Tirole, 2000) 7. The limit cases of λ reveal an interesting insight. If λ = 1,
which means that none of the consumers give their cookies in the first stage, this results in
pA1 = p
B
1 = θ¯, the prices match a uniform pricing strategy. If λ = 0, which means that all
consumers share their information in the first stage, we get that pA1 = pB1 =
4
3
θ¯, which is a
standard behavior-based pricing strategy. Therefore, for all values of λ in between 0 and 1,
pA1 and pB1 represent a mixture of uniform pricing and behavior-based pricing. Consumers
are best off by giving their cookies, because they can benefit from the lower customized
prices in the second stage. This means consumers act strategically 8. By revealing their
information they increase the competition between firms. Therefore, revealing cookies is a
dominant strategy. In this case the pooling equilibrium is driven by consumers and not an
optimal equilibrium from a firm’s perspective.
4.2 Incomplete Information
In this section we analyze a setting where firms can only learn about cookies of customers
who actually bought from them, i.e., β = 0. This implies that there is incomplete information
in the market, as for example consumers of firm B, might reveal their purchasing history to
B, such that B can identify them. However, firm A does not receive the information and
therefore these consumers are anonymous to A. The pricing strategy in the second period is
distinct from the complete information setting, where three different prices were set by each
firm after consumers made a decision regarding their cookie choices. In comparison, in the
incomplete information setting firms cannot distinguish between a competitor’s customers
and their own anonymous consumers. They are just one mass of non-identifiable consumers.
This implies that firms can not set a poaching price to steal buyers from each other. The
pricing strategy for the second period only entails a loyalty price, pi2,i and an anonymous
customer price, pi2 for i = A,B. The first-period pricing is similar to the complete information
case and not affected by the difference in the information setting. As before, there is a
7The results also hold if transportation costs are quadratic. See Appendix.
8The result extends to the case where consumers are myopic. As a robustness check, we show that being
strategic or myopic does not affect the consumers’ decisions. See Appendix.
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marginal consumer in the first stage, θ1(p1) who is indifferent between buying from A and
B. The analysis is similar to Colombo (2016). However, the essential difference is that
he treats λ as a parameter, while we use it as proxy for consumers’ endogenous decisions
regarding their cookies.
In the incomplete information setting the Hotelling lines cannot be separated as in the
complete information setting. The reason is that the anonymous price serves two functions.
Firstly, it is the price for the own consumers who are not identifiable and secondly, it serves
as a “poaching price” for competitors’ consumers. The graph below depicts this clearly, since
pi2 appears on both Hotelling lines. Firms want to maximize their profits by choosing prices
pi2,i and pi2 for i = A,B in the second stage. As before, there is a share 1 − λ of consumers
who choose to give their cookies and a share λ of consumers who hide their cookies. Firms’
beliefs about the location of the anonymous and identifiable consumers are again given by the
marginal consumers. For the share λ of consumers who are anonymous there is an indifferent
customer located at θ2, impartial between buying from A at price pA2 and B at price pB2 .
For the identifiable consumers, there is a marginal consumer in each of the companies’ turfs:
θA
′
2 is indifferent between buying from A as identifiable consumer and buying from B as
anonymous customer, whereas θB′2 is the respective cut-off value on B’s turf.
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Figure 2: Customer segments under incomplete information
Figure 2 shows customer segmentation and price setting in a rectangle of Hotelling lines,
where the two lines are again connected by λ. Firm’s beliefs are again that anonymous
consumers to the left of θ2 buy from firm A and to the right buy from B. Given the
consumers choose to identify, firms believe that to the left of θA′2 and to the right of θB
′
2
consumers are loyal. While consumers with θ ∈ (θA′2 , θ1) and θ ∈ (θ1, θB′2 ) are “poached” by
the competitive firm with the anonymous price.
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From Figure 2 we derive the maximization problems of the companies:
max
pA2 ,p
A
2,A
piA2 = max
pA2 ,p
A
2,A
λpA2 θ2 + (1− λ)pA2,AθA + (1− λ)pA2 (θB − θ1)
max
pB2 ,p
B
2,B
piB2 = max
pB2 ,p
B
2,B
λpB2 (θ¯ − θ2) + (1− λ)pB2,B(θ¯ − θB) + (1− λ)pB2 (θ1 − θA)
Lemma 2 Solving the maximization problems, we can derive the following prices for the
second stage. For firm A:
pA2 (λ,p1) =
(9− 2λ+ 5λ2)θ¯ − 4(3− λ)(1− λ)θ1
3 [4− (1− λ)2]
pA2,A(λ,p1) =
(3 + 10λ− λ2)θ¯ + 2(3− λ)(1− λ)θ1
3 [4− (1− λ)2]
For firm B:
pB2 (λ,p1) =
(−3 + 14λ+ λ2)θ¯ − 4(3− λ)(1− λ)θ1
3 [4− (1− λ)2]
pB2,B(λ,p1) =
(9 + 2λ+ λ2)θ¯ − 2(3− λ)(1− λ)θ1
3 [4− (1− λ)2]
Proof. See Appendix.
The second-period prices in this case are not only dependent on the first-period prices, as is
the case in the analysis of the complete information setting, but they also depend on λ as
the share of buyers who choose to be anonymous.
All prices increase with λ, i.e., the more likely consumers are to hide their cookies,
the higher are not only the anonymous prices but also the loyalty prices of both firms. This
always holds for θ¯ = 1 and θ1 = 12
9, two assumptions used in the literature (Colombo, 2016).
The first is a simple standardization of the length of the Hotelling line, while the second uses
the assumption that the line is separated symmetrically between the firms. Since firms are
symmetric, the assumption is not restrictive. In the following analysis of the second-period
prices we apply these assumptions. The Appendix contains more general results.
When studying the limit cases of λ = 0 and λ→ 1 10, we can observe that under λ = 0 the
loyalty prices for both firms are 2
3
and the anonymous prices are 1
3
. These results correspond
to the loyalty prices in the complete information case and the poaching prices, respectively.
Given λ→ 1 all prices converge to θ¯ = 1, the uniform pricing strategy.
9When solving for the first period we can show that this is the case. See Proposition 2.
10Notice that for λ = 1, the loyalty prices are no longer contained in the maximization problems.
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We can also show that within the range of λ ∈ [0, 1] the loyalty and anonymous prices
do not cross which can be seen in Figure 3. 11 Therefore, even though the anonymous
prices increase with λ, they are always below the loyalty prices. In Figure 3, we observe a
situation that is similar to the prisoner’s dilemma. Consumers face higher prices when they
have probability of λ → 1 for anonymizing. Pricing will correspond to uniform prices. On
the other hand, if consumers were to decide to hide their information with probability 0, this
would lead them to a price of 2
3
which is below 1. This means if consumers can coordinate
on putting zero probability on anonymizing, such that λ = 0, they would all gain. However,
consumers have an incentive to deviate to stay anonymous with a positive probability, since
they face an even lower anonymous price for any λ > 0. This incentive leads all consumers
to anonymize.
Figure 3: Prices of Firm A under restrictions
Since the prices of firm A and B are identical under these restrictions, we are only looking
at the graph of prices for firm A as an example. The spread of the two price curves is getting
smaller the larger λ is such that the incentive to deviate to a higher anonymous probability
also decreases, since the price gap narrows with λ.
Because consumers’ best strategy is to hide their cookies with probability λ→ 1, the two
periods in this game are independent of each other. Therefore, in the first stage the firms
solve the following maximization problems:
11For the formal analysis see Appendix.
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piA = pA1 θ1 + pi
A
2 → max
pA1
piB = pA1 (θ¯ − θ1) + piB2 → max
pB1
where θ1 =
pB1 −pA1 +θ¯
2
for λ = 1.
Proposition 2 In the incomplete information case, final prices all coincide with the uniform
pricing strategy, such that prices on the first and second stage are θ¯. Therefore, the PBE is
an equilibrium in pure strategies with λ = 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
Consumers have an incentive to choose to anonymize with highest probability, i.e. λ =
1. The results stands in contrast to the implication derived in the complete information
case where all consumers give their cookies (i.e. λ = 0). In the incomplete information
case companies obtain larger profits because they do not receive information about their
consumers. Therefore, the firms cannot set customized prices but have to conform to a
uniform pricing strategy.
4.3 General Case
In the previous sections, we have discussed the complete information (β = 1) and incomplete
information (β = 0) cases. Now we focus on the general scenario, to analyze the case where
each firm can randomly target part of their competitor’s turf in the second stage.
We use β to represent a firm’s targetability of their competitor’s turf in the second stage.
In the general case we look at β ∈ (0, 1). In other words, a β share of the opponent’s
consumers can be targeted. 12 The time line of the general case is as follows: in t = 1
competing firms set prices p1 = (pA1 , pB1 ) and consumers make their purchase decisions and
cookie choices simultaneously. In the second period, firms set different customized prices
p2 = (p
i
2,i, p
i
2, p
j
2,i). Then β is revealed, and consumers decide again where to buy depending
on the prices they are facing. Above the beliefs about the consumers’ locations were based
on their privacy choices, now firms form beliefs given the privacy choice and targetability of
consumers.
In the two extreme cases before we distinguished two Hotelling lines based on the privacy
choice of consumers. Here, we obtain three Hotelling lines: for consumers who are anony-
12β is public information. The realization of β is random.
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mous, for consumers who are identifiable but can not be targeted, and for consumers who
are identifiable and can be targeted. 13
Firms’ beliefs about consumers’ locations are determinded in the same way as in the
extreme cases above. The weighting of each Hotelling line is different. This is depicted in
Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Customer segments with pooling equilibrium
Anonymous consumers face pA2 and pB2 in the second stage. Firms believe that to the left
of θ2 consumers buy from firm A and to the right of θ2 they buy from B. Given consumers can
be identified but not targeted, firms segment the line as in the incomplete case where β = 0.
So that consumers with θ ∈ [0, θA′2 ) and θ ∈ (θB′2 , θ¯] are loyal to their firm. While consumers
to the left and right of θ1 are faced with the anonymous prices from the competitive firms.
Given consumers can be identified and targeted, firms segment the line as in the complete
case (β = 1) with θA2 and θB2 . Compared to the incomplete case, the only difference is that
consumers to the left and right of θ1 are poached with pj2,i from the competitive firms. The
maximization problems for the firms in the second stage are given by
13The reason why we treat those who can be targeted and who can not be targeted as separated Hotelling
lines is that β is revealed after firms set prices in the second stage. Hence, everyone has the same probability
β to be targeted by the competitor’s firm if they have decided to reveal their information.
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max
pA2 ,p
A
2,A,p
A
2,B
λpA2 θ2 + β(1− λ)
[
pA2,Aθ
A
2 + p
A
2,B(θ
B
2 − θ1)
]
+ (1− β)(1− λ)
[
pA2,Aθ
A′
2 + p
A
2 (θ
B′
2 − θ1)
]
max
pB2 ,p
B
2,B ,p
B
2,A
λpB2 (θ¯ − θ2) + β(1− λ)
[
pB2,A(θ1 − θA2 ) + pB2,B(θ¯ − θB2 )
]
+ (1− β)(1− λ)
[
pB2 (θ1 − θA
′
2 ) + p
B
2,B(θ¯ − θB
′
2 )
]
.
We derive all prices in the second stage as functions of θ1. The marginal consumers on the
first stage are obtained given the consumers’ privacy decisions. For anonymous consumers,
θˆ1 represents the marginal consumer who is indifferent between buying from firm A at pA1
and buying from firm B at pB1 , which is equivalent to
θˆ1 =
θ¯
2
+
1
2
(pB1 − pA1 ).
For identified consumers, θ1 is the marginal consumer who is indifferent between buying from
firm A at pA1 in stage 1 and from firm B at pB2,A with probability β or at pB2 with probability
1− β in stage 2, and buying from firm B at pB1 in stage 1 and afterward from firm A at pA2,B
with probability β or at pA2 with probability 1− β in stage 2,
v − pA1 − θ1 + β
[
v − pB2,A − (θ¯ − θ1)
]
+ (1− β) [v − pB2 − (θ¯ − θ1)]
= v − pB1 − (θ¯ − θ1) + β
[
v − pA2,B − θ1
]
+ (1− β) [v − pA2 − θ1]
which results in
θ1 =
4− β
8β
(pB1 − pA1 ) +
θ¯
2
.
The firms’ overall profits are then given by
max
pA1
λpA1 θˆ1 + (1− λ)pA1 θ1 + λpA2 θ2 + β(1− λ)
[
pA2,Aθ
A
2 + p
A
2,B(θ
B
2 − θ1)
]
+ (1− β)(1− λ)
[
pA2,Aθ
A′
2 + p
A
2 (θ
B′
2 − θ1)
]
max
pB2
λpB1 (θ¯ − θˆ1) + (1− λ)pB1 (θ¯ − θ1) + λpB2 (θ¯ − θ2) + β(1− λ)
[
pB2,A(θ1 − θA2 ) + pB2,B(θ¯ − θB2 )
]
+ (1− β)(1− λ)
[
pB2 (θ1 − θA
′
2 ) + p
B
2,B(θ¯ − θB
′
2 )
]
.
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Proposition 3 No pooling equilibrium exists when β ∈ (0, 1). There are unique pooling
equilibria when λ = 1 or λ = 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
5 Experiment
Our experimental design consists of three components. The first and main part is a multi-
stage market game, closely resembling our theoretical set-up. Second, we run a short and
simple iterative thinking task. Lastly, we conduct a survey on privacy concerns following
Malhotra et al. (2004) to collect the IUIPC score.14 This privacy survey allows us to compare
the abstract privacy decision of the market game with the general stance towards online
privacy issues.
Market game
Our implemented market game closely follows the theoretical set-up and aims at testing our
predictions concerning the buyers’ privacy choices and the sellers’ pricing choices under the
two information set-ups. Subjects take the role of sellers or buyers, with roles remaining
fixed for the duration of the experiment. Each market contains two sellers and six buyers
and lasts for two periods. Two markets m ∈ {1, 2} are simultaneously formed within one
matching group, with matching groups consisting of four sellers j ∈ {A,B,C,D} and six
buyers i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. The buyers are active in both markets, while sellers are only active
in one market. This allows for a randomization of seller composition between market rounds,
so that markets are independent between rounds and resemble one-shot interaction.15
An experimental market consists of eight adjacent locations, with the two sellers being
located at either end and the six buyers in between on distinct locations as depicted in Figure
5.
Similar to Camacho-Cuena et al. (2005) and Barreda-Tarrazona et al. (2011) we allow
sellers to choose integer prices from the interval ∈ [0, 10]. Buyers exert unit transport costs
per unit of distance traveled.16 Due to this discretization of prices and transport costs,
equilibrium predictions are in pure strategies.
14The full questionnaire is listed in the appendix.
15In comparable seller-only experiments by Brokesova et al. (2014) matching groups of four were shown
to be suitable, according to Mahmood (2014) buyer involvement increases when active in multiple markets.
16For example, a buyer at location five has to bear transport costs of five to buy from a seller at location
zero.
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Figure 5: Conversion of theoretical into experimental market
Buyers have an induced reservation value of 15. The utility of a buyer for a purchase is
U it = 15− pit − θ
with pit describing the price of the product that buyer i chose in period t. A seller j receives
the profit
Πj = p
j
1 · nj1 + pj2 · nj
′
2
with pj1 corresponding to the chosen first-period price under which n
j
1 is the number of buyers
who bought from j. Similar pj2 is the vector of the second period prices and n
j
2 the vector
of second period buyers who bought from j. Our two main treatment variations are the
i) complete information and ii) incomplete information set-up according to our theoretical
model.
In an ensuing questionnaire we ask participants to express their stance towards privacy
and whether they are concerned about privacy breaches. Beresford et al. (2012) found that
subjects did not act according to their stated preferences in a comparable environment. How-
ever, the sensitive information in their case was exogenous and not related to the purchasing
decision. In our experiment the relevant information emerges endogenously and is highly
relevant for the purchasing decision in the second period.
Iterative thinking task
The iterative thinking task is a variation of the Game of 21 (Dufwenberg et al., 2010; Gneezy
et al., 2010). In our version, players take turns increasing a counter that starts at 0 by
increments of 1, 2 or 3. The game ends when either of two players reaches 22, where the
player who picks 22 loses. Thereby, the game stays true to the original variation, where the
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player who picks 21 wins the game directly. Instead of using an interactive game between two
subjects as intended in the original variation, we let each subject play against the computer.
This is necessary in order to gather a measure on correct iterative reasoning for every subject.
17 Subjects learn that they play against the computer, without any detailed explanation on
how the computer chooses. Thus, unknown to the players, the computer will avoid winning,
while randomizing between the two or three available options.18
This task serves several purposes. We suspect that pricing decisions in this rather complex
environment to be cognitively challenging for subjects. Heterogeneity of the subjects could
lead to different observations of pricing behavior. We capture some of this heterogeneity
in the capability of iterative reasoning. Likewise, buyers’ privacy choices may be correlated
with their ability to backward induct. A pragmatic purpose is that the task generates a
“mental distance” between the market game and the privacy survey. We wish to capture the
general stance on privacy of our subjects, which may be confounded due to the recent play of
a market game which deals with privacy issues. While a confounding factor may not be an
issue for within-treatment comparisons, it could affect between-treatment comparisons. We
are mainly interested in the privacy concern measure for buyers and the iterative reasoning
ability for sellers. But due to the stated reasons we collect both measures for both sides of
the market.
Predictions
We present hypotheses which are fully based on our theoretical model and suggest explicit
pricing, privacy and switching patterns. The predictions are confronted with behavioral
conjectures based on prior experimental findings on privacy and behavior-based pricing. We
incorporate our measures for iterative thinking and privacy concern to help approximate
those suggestions to our experimental set-up.
Hypotheses
Table 1 summarizes pricing, privacy and switching predictions based on our model, given
the experimental parameterization. We expect that all buyers reveal their information in
the complete information set-up, while only exactly one buyer should reveal the information
17If two players interact and one plays the optimal strategy, no conclusions can be drawn concerning the
other player.
18Whenever the player is on the winning path, the computer will randomize between all three options,
while only randomizing between the two options which avoid the winning path, whenever the player is not
on the winning path.
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in the incomplete information set-up.19 Note that the theoretically predicted prices in both
treatments are the same for two extreme cases. When all buyers disclose their information,
both set-ups correspond to BBPD. The opposite case, i.e. full anonymization, corresponds
to the uniform pricing benchmark. While full disclosure is always better for the consumers,
the incomplete information set-up yields a coordination problem for the buyers, since every
buyer has an incentive to anonymize.
Treatment complete information incomplete information
Introductory price 8 6
New customer price 6 6
Loyalty price 4 6
Switching price 2 (6)
Share of information disclosure 100% 0%
Share of inefficient switching 33.3¯% 0%
Table 1: Theoretical pricing, privacy and switching predictions
Behavioral conjectures
Beresford et al. (2012); Preibusch et al. (2013) find that subjects did not act on their stated
privacy concerns. Following this we should not see differences in behavior between those
subjects that we classify as privacy concerned compared to those that are unconcerned.
Brokesova et al. (2014) conducted BBPD experiments with subjects taking the role of
sellers, while buyers were computerized. They find that point predictions do not hold, but
comparative statics predictions do. In one treatment two second period prices were chosen
and predicted to be equal to the first period price. However, they find that second period
prices were lower than first period prices. We predict similar price patterns in the incomplete
treatment, with two prices in the second period which are predicted to be equal to the first
period price. Hence, behaviorally we would suspect subjects to decrease the second period
prices compared to the first period prices.20
Schudy and Utikal (2017) have shown that subjects are less inclined to share information,
the more parties are involved who receive the information. Subjects in our experiment face a
similar situation, where there are two recipients in the complete information setup and only
19Acutally, our theory predicts full anonymization but rests on the fact that consumers are massless. Due
to the discretization buyers bear a mass in the experiment. However, no matter what the number of buyers
is, only exactly one should disclose the information.
20This might be caused by sellers trying to react and best respond to first period prices or due to the
increased perceived risk, since the individual second period prices target less consumers compared to the
first period price.
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one in the incomplete information setup. Still, subjects benefit from sharing information in
the former case. We expect that subjects disclose more information similar to the findings of
Schudy and Utikal (2017) if they do not grasp the strategic interactions of the market game.
In total we invited 160 students in 8 sessions of 20 each as subjects in our experiment,
with 96 taking the role of buyers and 64 taking the role of sellers. On average subjects
earned about 20 EUR in the 90 minutes experiment. Most subjects are majors in economics,
mathematics or industrial engineering and 36% of the subjects were female.Sessions were
conducted in the laboratory of TU and WZB in July and September 2019...????
6 Results
Treatment complete information incomplete information
Introductory price
Observed mean 5.68 5.48
Model prediction 8 6
New customer price
Observed mean 4.19 4.02
Model prediction 6 6
Loyalty price
Observed mean 4.12 3.97
Model prediction 4 6
Switching price
Observed mean 3.28 (4.02)
Model prediction 2 (6)
Share of information disclosure
Observed mean 67.19% 65.36%
Model prediction 100% 0%
Share of inefficient switching
Observed mean 23.18% 15.73%
Model prediction 33.3¯% 0%
Table 2: Summary statistics for pricing, privacy and switching behavior per treatment
Our main interest in the market game is the pricing strategies of sellers and the infor-
mation disclosure by buyers. Table 2 shows the mean results and the associated predictions.
At first glance introductory prices appear to be slightly higher in the complete information
case compared to the incomplete information case, while both are below their predicted
levels. In both treatments loyalty prices and new customer prices are very close, which
we only predicted for the incomplet information case. The switching price in the complete
information treatment is lower compared to the other second period prices. The share of
consumers who disclose their information is nearly equal in both treatments with around 2
3
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of the consumers disclosing their information. Inefficient switching is higher in the complete
information treatment compared to the incomplete information treatment.
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Figure 6: Histograms of side measures
In Figure 6 we show the distributions of our side measures concerning iterative thinking
capabilities and privacy concern. Our findings in the Game of 22 (Figure 6a) are in line
with Dufwenberg et al. (2010), with the majority of subjects being able to solve 2 steps
of backward induction. In contrast to their results our subjects did not show an ability to
immediately solve the game, with barely anyone solving the full 6 steps of induction. In
total these results suggest that the game is suitable as a rough measure of iterative thinking
capability and we can not detect any differences between our treatments. In the following
we classify the subjects into three groups. The first group contains those subjects who score
below average, with either 1 or 0 steps of induction and contains 37.50% of the subjects. The
second group contains those subject who score the average of 2 steps and contains 35.00%
of the subjects. The last group contains all the subjects who score above average that is 3
or higher and contains the remaining 27.50% of the subjects.
Our findings on privacy concern are depicted in Figure 6b. This distribution does not
show remarkable treatment differences. However, there is an overall tendency towards pri-
vacy concern among our subjects. Going onwards we classify our subjects into two groups,
using the median (0.2014) as a breaking point. All subjects who scored below the median
are classified as “privacy concerned” and all who are above are classified as “privacy uncon-
cerned”.21 We use these measures to get a deeper understanding on what is driving the
information disclosure which seems to be unaffected by our treatment variation.
21All following results are consistent with a stricter classification of privacy concern, by using the 75th
percentile as the breaking point opposed to the median.
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Figure 7: Average cookie choices by treatment and privacy concern of buyers
In Figure 7 we show the average rate of information disclosure over period by treatment
and privacy concern classification. There are two major observations here. In the first ten
rounds subjects have very similar information sharing rates apart from the privacy uncon-
cerned consumers in the incomplete information treatment, who seem to be more willing to
share their information. This might reflect the findings of Schudy and Utikal (2017) since in
the incomplete information treatment there is one recipient compared to two recipients in
the complete information treatment. However, for both privacy concerned and unconcered
buyers we see a drop in information sharing over the periods, where especially concerned
buyers in the incomplete treatment drop below the sharing rates of the remaining three
groups in the last 10 rounds.
In Table 3 we explore these presumptions by employing a mixed effects logit model on
the cookie choices of buyers, while controlling for demographics and experiment specific
factors, as well as the iterative thinking capability. Specification (1) and (2) show that there
is no blunt treatment effect visible. In specifications (3) and (4) we explore the role of
learning, by including a dummy variable which indicates the second half of the experiment,
corresponding to rounds 11 and after.22 There is a significant drop of information disclosure
in the incomplete information treatment, while there is no change after learning in the
22Results are similar when using a continuous variables indicating the round instead of the dummy for
the second half.
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Dependent variable: Cookie choice ∈ {0, 1}
Learning +
Treatment Learning Privacy concern Privacy concern
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Incomplete 0.036 0.044 0.442 0.449 0.543 0.614∗ 0.965∗∗ 1.044∗∗∗
(0.278) (0.260) (0.295) (0.278) (0.382) (0.359) (0.399) (0.375)
Second half -0.046 -0.046 -0.046 -0.046
(0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107)
Incomplete -0.763∗∗∗ -0.763∗∗∗ -0.766∗∗∗ -0.768∗∗∗
× Second half (0.156) (0.156) (0.156) (0.156)
Concerned 0.029 -0.144 0.029 -0.145
(0.375) (0.353) (0.382) (0.359)
Incomplete -1.008∗ -1.180∗∗ -1.038∗ -1.223∗∗
× Concerned (0.533) (0.495) (0.543) (0.504)
Market No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Demographics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Cognitive ability No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 3840 3800 3840 3800 3840 3800 3840 3800
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Mixed effects logit with group and subject clustering.
Table 3: Mixed effects logit results
complete information treatment. Similarly, we can find that concerned subjects are less
likely to share information in the incomplete treatment, but not in the complete treatment,
as depicted in specification (5) and (6). Lastly, specification (7) and (8) show that both
effects are apparent simultaneously. The impact of the incomplete treatment is also strongly
significant in specifications (7) and (8), since it captures the decisions of unconcerned subjects
in the earlier rounds.
In Figure 8 we show the price paths per treatment. Similar to our descriptive summary
we observe that introductory prices are larger than second period prices and only sellers in
the complete information treatment seem to employ price discrimination by offering lower
switching prices for consumers who share their information and bought from the competing
seller in the introduction period. We find significant differences between all second period
prices compared to first period prices. There are only significant differences between poaching
prices compared to loyalty price and anonymous price in the complete information treatment
among the second period prices. In line with the findings of Brokesova et al. (2014) we find
evidence for comparative statics results but not for point predictions in terms of pricing
strategies. Similar to their findings subjects tend to set lower second period prices compared
to first period prices even when there is no strategic benefit to it. The relation of information
disclosure and pricing strategies is more involved. Especially in the incomplete information
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Figure 8: Average prices per period for both treatments
treatment the high rate of information sharing should have led sellers to increase their loyalty
prices according to our theory. However, sellers seem reluctant to actually do this. Either
sellers did not understand the strategic interaction, specifically that loyal customers tend
to be closer to their location or sellers are driven by trust or reciprocity, such that they do
not punish loyal customers with higher prices when those were the ones who shared their
information with them. Note that poaching prices are lower compared to anonymous prices
and represent a reward for sharing the information in the complete information treatment.
Introductory
price
New
customer
price
Loyalty
price
Poaching
price
Incomplete -0.205 -0.021 -0.173 0.167 -0.153 0.162 0.741∗ 0.920∗
(0.442) (0.395) (0.503) (0.444) (0.423) (0.345) (0.446) (0.499)
Demographics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Cognitive ability No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Random-effects regression. Clustering on group level.
Table 4: Random-effects regression on treatment effects for prices
In Table 4 we show results from random-effects regression on the seller panel with clus-
tering on group level. We find no effect on loyalty and new customer prices. The sign of
the effect on introductory prices corresponds to our prediction but is insignificant. There
is a significant effect on poaching prices, indicating that sellers poach more in the complete
information treatment.
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7 Welfare
In this section, we do not claim to make general statements about the regulation the Eu-
ropean Union implemented. The reality of the GDPR is different from our framework. We
are looking at a situation where two symmetric firms compete for consumers and each firm
offers a clear choice on data privacy. This reflects a simplified version of reality. Nonetheless,
we can show through which channels the GDPR works and how it affects consumers and
firms. The following analysis is based on the two pooling equilibria we find for the extreme
information settings. We compare these information settings for different measures of welfare
to show the interests of consumers and firms.
Firms clearly prefer a setting where information is not shared with a competitor, since
here their profits are larger:
pi∗β=1 =
17
18
θ¯2 < pi∗β=0 = θ¯
2.
This is due to an increase in competition under full information and consumer’s strategy to
not share information under incomplete information. This is why prices are higher under
incomplete information.
For consumers the case is not as simple, since they receive different utilities based on
their type. The type-dependent utilities for the different information settings are given by
the following terms:
U∗β=1(A, θ) = 2(v − θ¯ − θ) for θ ∈ [0,
θ¯
3
)
U∗β=1(AB, θ) = 2v −
8
3
θ¯ for θ ∈ ( θ¯
3
,
2θ¯
3
)
U∗β=1(B, θ) = 2(v − 2θ¯ + θ) for θ ∈ (
2θ¯
3
, θ¯]
U∗β=0(A, θ) = 2(v − θ¯ − θ) for θ ∈ [0,
θ¯
2
)
U∗β=0(B, θ) = 2(v − 2θ¯ + θ) for θ ∈ (
θ¯
2
, θ¯]
When comparing the utility levels with different information settings, we find that consumers
are indifferent between the information settings for θ ∈ [0, θ¯
3
) and θ ∈ (2θ¯
3
, θ¯] but obtain a
higher utility for θ ∈ ( θ¯
3
, 2θ¯
3
) under the complete information setting. Consumers who are
located further away from the firms can benefit from behavior-based pricing.
The consumer surplus shows that overall utility is larger under the complete information
setting.
CSβ=1 = 2vθ¯ − 22
9
θ¯2
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CSβ=0 = 2vθ¯ − 5
2
θ¯2
CSβ=1 > CSβ=0
Consumers and firms prefer opposing information settings. Consumers’ interest is to
share their data with all firms on the market because firms cannot commit to not using the
data. On the other hand, firms benefit from a situation where each competitor keeps the
data of their consumers to themselves. Therefore, the level of data available to firms drive
the results.
The overall welfare level is higher under the firm-preferred information setting. The effi-
ciency loss incurred by firms under complete information is larger than the loss of consumers
under incomplete information. Normally, a setting with complete information leads to an
efficient outcome. Here, however, asymmetric information gives a larger welfare, which is
due to the anonymization of consumers in that case.
Wβ=1 = 2vθ¯ − 5
9
θ¯2
Wβ=1 > 0⇔ 5
18
v > θ¯
Wβ=0 = 2vθ¯ − 1
2
θ¯2
Wβ=0 > 0⇔ 4v > θ¯
Wβ=0 > Wβ=1
The welfare loss under the complete information setting is driven by inefficient switching of
consumers that are poached by the other firm. While consumers gain from switching, as can
be seen in the comparison of the utility levels, firms lose profits (compared to the incomplete
information setting) because of the lower poaching prices they set.
In Figure 9 we observe that subjects in the experiment are more likely to switch in
the complete information setting because sellers offer lower prices to poach consumers from
their competitor. For all locations we observe higher switching rates in the complete treat-
ment compared to the incomplete treatment. This is in line with the fact that we observe
poaching efforts by sellers in the complete information treatment, but not in the incomplete
information treatment as shown in Figure 8.
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Figure 9: Switching by proximity to closest seller
8 Conclusion and Outlook
In this paper, we show that under the two distinct information settings two opposing optimal
strategies for consumers regarding their information choice result. When both firms get the
same information about buyers, it is best for consumers to reveal their cookies. This is the
only equilibrium under pooling.
In the incomplete information setting where consumers’ cookies are only passed on to
the firm that they have bought from, it is an optimal strategy for all consumers to hide
their purchasing history. When firms’ targetability is between 0 and 1, we do not find an
equilibrium under our pooling assumption.
In the experiment, we find a treatment effect for the concerned subjects. Concerned
subjects share less information in the incomplete treatment. The effect is more pronounced
for the second half of the experiment. In the first half, the privacy unconcerned buyers share
more information when only one seller receives the information. We observe that sellers
employ behavior-based pricing only in the complete treatment.
There are several directions to extend our research. The next steps include an analysis
of potential separating equilibria in the different information settings. Opposed to a monop-
olistic market we can not exclude separating equilibria here. First results suggest that such
equilibria might exist when sellers set equal loyalty and anonymous prices. This is in line
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with the pricing strategies that we observe in the experiment for both treatments. With new
theoretical results on separating equilibria, we can check for corresponding patterns in our
experimental data.
Another possible venture is to explore a setting where consumers choose different prob-
abilities to share information with each seller. This implies extreme situations where con-
sumers might select themselves into situations similar to the complete and incomplete setting,
but also they might share information solely with their sellers competitor. Related to that
is the case of imperfect information where one firm receives more or better information than
the other.
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Appendix
Quadratic transportation costs
In this model, the utility for a consumer with the location of θ is either v− pi− θ2 if buying
from Firm A, or v−pj−(θ¯−θ)2 if buying from Firm B. As in the standard model, we employ
backward induction and finally get that pA1 = pB1 =
4
3+λ
θ¯2, and θ1 = 12 θ¯, p
A
A = p
B
B =
2
3
θ¯2,
pAB = p
B
A =
1
3
θ¯2. If the cost is quadratic in the standard behavior-based pricing model, prices
in the first stage are pA1 = pB1 =
4
3
θ¯2, and uniform pricing strategy is pA1 = pB1 = θ¯2. Thus,
each buyer gives their cookies, in order to get the lower price in the second stage. λ is 0,
and all the results in the complete case hold with quadratic costs.
Proof of Lemma 1
By plugging θA2 =
θ¯
2
+
pB2,A−pA2,A
2
and θB2 =
θ¯
2
+
pB2,B−pA2,B
2
into the maximization problems, we
have
max
pA2,A,p
A
2,B
(1− λ)[pA2,A( θ¯2 + pB2,A − pA2,A2 ) + pA2,B( θ¯2 + pB2,B − pA2,B2 − θ1)]
max
pB2,B ,p
B
2,A
(1− λ)[pB2,B(θ¯ − θ¯2 − pB2,B − pA2,B2 ) + pB2,A(θ1 − θ¯2 − pB2,A − pA2,A2 )]
First-order conditions solve
(1− λ)[ θ¯
2
+
pB2,A
2
− pA2,A
]
= 0
(1− λ)[ θ¯
2
+
pB2,B
2
− pA2,B − θ1
]
= 0
(1− λ)[ θ¯
2
− pB2,B +
pA2,B
2
] = 0
(1− λ)[θ1 − θ¯
2
− pB2,A +
pA2,A
2
] = 0
where we can derive the results in Lemma 1 easily.
Proof of Proposition 1
In the case where all consumers reveal their information, beliefs about anonymous consumers
are off-equilibrium. Consistent off-equilibrium beliefs are that no consumer is located on
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the Hotelling with mass λ, so that setting pA2 ≥ pi2,i, pi2,j is a best response. Then no
consumer anonymizes because prices are higher than under revealing information. The price
comparison shows that this best response holds. Assume towards a contradiction that there
is a PBE where consumers place a positive probability on anonymizing. Any consumer
type only has an incentive to deviate if they are offered a price that is lower or at least
equal to the price they are paying now. Given firms’ profit-maximizing prices in the second
stage (derived in Lemma 1), anonymous prices are always higher than loyal or poaching
prices independent of λ. Therefore, consumers do not have an incentive to put a positive
probability on anonymizing.
Comparing loyalty prices to anonymous prices, exemplary for firm A
pA2 > p
A
2,A ⇔θ¯ >
1
3
(2θ1 + θ¯)
θ¯ > θ1
This is always the case, since the marginal consumer in the first period is always smaller
than the length of the product space. Therefore, pA2 > pA2,A.
Comparing poaching price to anonymous price:
pA2,B < p
A
2 ⇔
1
3
(3θ1 − 4θ¯) < θ¯
θ1 <
7θ¯
3
This is always the case, since the marginal consumer is in-between the two firms and cannot
be larger than the line segment itself. Therefore pA2 > pA2,B.
Comparing competitors poaching price with loyalty price:
pA2 > p
B
2,A ⇔θ¯ >
4θ1 − θ¯
3
4θ¯
3
>
4θ1
3
θ¯ > θ1
This always holds. Therefore pA2 > pB2,A.
Complete Information with Myopic Consumers
In the main analysis we consider consumers to be strategic. Now we want to extend our
analysis to the case in which some consumers are myopic in the first stage with regard to their
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purchasing decision (Baye and Sapi, 2014; Carroni et al., 2015). We assume that there is a
share α of myopic consumers and a share 1−α of strategic consumers. For myopic consumers,
their rationale is to choose the cheaper good in the first stage, however, they are strategic
afterwards, including the cookie choice and the purchasing decision in the second stage. To
the contrary, strategic consumers are always forward-looking in both stages. Therefore, the
difference in this setting lies in the first stage, where, among myopic consumers, marginal
consumer θ′1 is just indifferent between buying from firm A at pA1 in stage 1 and buying from
firm B at pB1 in stage 1, that is, v−pA1 −θ′1 = v−pB1 −(θ¯−θ′1), leading to θ′1 = θ¯2 + p
B
1 −pA1
2
. On
the other hand, among strategic consumers23, the cut-off consumer θ1 is indifferent between
buying from firm A at pA1 in stage 1 and then buys from firm B at pB2,A in stage 2, and buying
from firm B at pB1 in stage 1 and then buys from firm A at pA2,B in stage 2 24, therefore,
v − pA1 − θ1 +
[
v − pB2,A − (θ¯ − θ1)
]
= v − pB1 − (θ¯ − θ1) +
[
v − pA2,B − θ1
]
In order to solve this two-stage problem we apply backward induction. Starting from
the second stage, again there are two separated Hotelling lines, respectively for consumers
who did and who did not give their cookies. No matter whether they belong to the group of
myopic consumers or the group of strategic consumers, the cut-offs are the same, since even
myopic consumers are also strategic in the second stage. Among those who gave their cookies
in the first stage, the two cut-offs, θA2 and θB2 , are equivalent to
θ¯
2
+
pB2,A−pA2,A
2
and θ¯
2
+
pB2,B−pA2,B
2
,
respectively25. Moreover, for those who did not give their cookies in the first stage, as we
discussed before, they will face uniform pricing in the second stage, with pA2 = pB2 = θ¯ and
θ2 =
θ¯
2
.
Therefore, the competitors maximize their profits from the Hotelling line with mass 1−λ
as follows
max
pA2,A,p
A
2,B
α(1− λ) [pA2,AθA2 + pA2,B(θB2 − θ′1)]+ (1− α)(1− λ) [pA2,AθA2 + pA2,B(θB2 − θ1)]
max
pB2,B ,p
B
2,A
α(1− λ) [pB2,B(θ¯ − θB2 ) + pB2,A(θ′1 − θA2 )]+ (1− α)(1− λ) [pB2,B(θ¯ − θB2 ) + pB2,A(θ1 − θA2 )]
Lemma 3 Combining these two optimization problems and deriving the first order condi-
23To make it more precise, strategic consumers mean those who are forward-looking and give their cookies
in the first stage.
24This indifferent condition is the same as in the complete information case without myopic consumers.
25The method to derive these cut-offs are identical to the complete information case.
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tions, we obtain the following prices in the second stage
pA2,A =
θ¯
3
+
2
3
θ1 +
2
3
α(θ′1 − θ1) pA2,B = θ¯ −
4
3
θ1 +
4
3
α(θ1 − θ′1)
pB2,B = θ¯ −
2
3
θ1 +
2
3
α(θ1 − θ′1) pB2,A = −
θ¯
3
+
4
3
θ1 +
4
3
α(θ′1 − θ1)
Note that on the Hotelling line with consumer mass λ nothing changes and therefore the
prices correspond to uniform pricing.
On the first stage, the cut-offs are different among the myopic consumers and strategic
consumers, and also depend on whether they give the cookies or not. Therefore, there
are four groups of different consumers. Among the mass of λ consumers who do not give
the cookies, a mass of αλ are myopic and a mass of (1 − α)λ are strategic. However, no
matter whether they are myopic or strategic, the cut-offs they face are the same, that is
θ′1 =
θ¯
2
+
pB1 −pA1
2
26. Similarly, among the mass of 1−λ consumers who give the cookies, there
are α(1 − λ) myopic consumers facing the cut-off of θ′1, while a mass of (1 − α)(1 − λ) are
strategic consumers with the cut-off of θ1.
Combining these indifferent conditions and the results from Lemma 3, we get that θ′1 =
θ¯
2
+
pB1 −pA1
2
and θ1 = θ¯2 − 4α−38(1−α)(pB1 − pA1 ). Maximizing the overall profits in the first period
with respect to the first-stage prices, the two firms have the resulting objective functions
piA = α
[
λpA1 θ
′
1 + (1− λ)pA1 θ′1 + λpA2 θ2 + (1− λ)pA2,AθA2 + (1− λ)pA2,B(θB2 − θ′1)
]
+ (1− α)[λpA1 θ′1 + (1− λ)pA1 θ1 + λpA2 θ2 + (1− λ)pA2,AθA2 + (1− λ)pA2,B(θB2 − θ1)]
piB = α
[
λpB1 (θ¯ − θ′1) + (1− λ)pB1 (θ¯ − θ′1) + λpB2 (θ¯ − θ2) + (1− λ)pB2,B(θ¯ − θB2 ) + (1− λ)pB2,A(θ′1 − θA2 )
]
+ (1− α)[λpB1 (θ¯ − θ′1) + (1− λ)pB1 (θ¯ − θ1) + λpB2 (θ¯ − θ2)
+ (1− λ)pB2,B(θ¯ − θB2 ) + (1− λ)pB2,A(θ1 − θA2 )
]
26θ′1 will not be influenced by the prices in the second stage, which is similar to the complete information
case.
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Lemma 4 Substituting the respective prices into the system of equations given by the first-
order conditions, we derive the final results for the first- and second-stage prices:
pA1 = p
B
1 =
4
3 + λ
θ¯
pA2,A = p
B
2,B =
2
3
θ¯
pA2,B = p
B
2,A =
1
3
θ¯
pA2 = p
B
2 = θ¯
Everyone chooses to give cookies, therefore the optimal λ is 1 and the resulting prices are
identical to the complete information case.
The result above is a robustness check, showing that being strategic or myopic does not
affect any decisions. Buyers always choose to give their cookies, in order to benefit from the
competition; while firms use standard behavior-based price discrimination to maximize their
profits.
Proof of Lemma 2
When maximizing the profit functions of the second stage, we get the following expressions
for the first-order conditions:
∂piA2
∂pA2
=
λ
2
(pB2 − 2pA2 + θ¯) +
(1− λ)
2
(pB2,B − 2pA2 + θ¯)− (1− λ)θ¯ = 0
∂piA2
∂pA2,A
=
(1− λ)
2
(pB2 − 2pA2,A + θ¯) = 0
∂piB2
∂pB2
=
λ
2
(−2pB2 + pA2 + θ¯) +
(1− λ)
2
(−2pB2 + pA2,A − θ¯ + 2θ1) = 0
∂piB2
∂pB2,B
=
(1− λ)
2
(−2pB2,B + pA2 + θ¯) = 0
This gives a system of equations, where prices are dependent on each other and need to be
substituted into each other in order to receive the final set of prices of the second period
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that are only depending on λ and p1.
pA2,A(p
B
2 ) =
θ¯ + pB2
2
pA2 (p
B
2 ) =
(3− λ)θ¯ + 2λ · pB2 − 4(1− λ)θ1
3 + λ
pB2,B(p
A
2 ) =
θ¯ + pA2
2
pB2 (p
A
2 ) =
−(1− 3λ)θ¯ + 2λ · pA2 + 4(1− λ)θ1
3 + λ
Analysis of second-period prices of section 4.2
The comparative static analysis of the prices in the second period of the incomplete infor-
mation case reveal that all prices increase with λ under the restriction that θ1 is symmetric
and θ¯ = 1. The general analysis gives certain conditions for which the property is fulfilled,
as well.
∂pA2
∂λ
=
8{(−3 + λ)2θ1 + [−3 + λ(6 + λ)] θ¯}
3(−3 + λ)2(1 + λ)2
∂pA2
∂λ
> 0⇔ 8{(−3 + λ)2θ1 + [−3 + λ(6 + λ)] θ¯} > 0
The partial derivative simplifies to 4
(−3+λ)2 under the restriction that θ¯ = 1 and θ1 = 0.5
which is always larger than zero.
∂pA2,A
∂λ
=
8 (λ2 + 3) θ¯ − 4(λ− 3)2θ1
3(λ− 3)2(λ+ 1)2
which is larger than zero if the nominator is larger than zero and can be simplified to 2
(λ−3)2
under the common restrictions. This term is always larger than zero. For firm B the same
applies:
∂pB2
∂λ
=
16 (λ2 + 3) θ¯ − 8(λ− 3)2θ1
3(λ− 3)2(λ+ 1)2
∂pB2,B
∂λ
=
4{(λ− 3)2θ1 + [λ(λ+ 6)− 3] θ¯}
3(λ− 3)2(λ+ 1)2
which are both larger than zero if the respective nominator is larger than zero. Applying
the usual restrictions on the line segment and the symmetric equilibrium, the former term
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simplifies to 4
(−3+λ)2 , while the latter is given by
2
(λ−3)2 .
Evaluating the limits of the prices for values of λ reveals information about the highest
and lowest possible prices within the range of λ, which can be easily seen in the graph of the
price curves (see Figure 3)
lim
λ→0
pA2,A =
3θ¯ + 6θ1
9
lim
λ→0
pA2 =
9θ¯ +−12θ1
9
which, evaluated at θ¯ = 1 and θ1 = 0.5, are 23 and
1
3
. These give the lowest possible loyalty
and anonymous prices for firm A. Whatsoever, the same holds for firm B, as well.
When studying the other end of the range, we have to consider that the loyalty prices
are not defined for a λ = 1, therefore we are observing the left-sided limit of λ→ 1.
lim
λ→1−
pA2,A = lim
n→∞
[
9− 2(1− 1
n
) + 5(1− 1
n
)2
]
θ¯ − 4 [3− (1− 1
n
)
] [
1− (1− 1
n
)
]
θ1
3{4− [1− (1− 1
n
)
]2} = 12θ¯12 = θ¯
This holds true for all prices.
The general results for the convexity of the prices is given by the following equations:
∂2pA2
∂λ2
= −16
(
(λ− 3)3θ1 + (λ(λ(λ+ 9)− 9) + 15)θ¯
)
3(λ− 3)3(λ+ 1)3
∂2pA2,A
∂λ2
=
8
(
(λ− 3)3θ1 − 2 (λ3 + 9λ− 6) θ¯
)
3(λ− 3)3(λ+ 1)3
∂2pB2
∂λ2
=
16
(
(λ− 3)3θ1 − 2 (λ3 + 9λ− 6) θ¯
)
3(λ− 3)3(λ+ 1)3
∂2pB2,B
∂λ2
= −8
(
(λ− 3)3θ1 + (λ(λ(λ+ 9)− 9) + 15)θ¯
)
3(λ− 3)3(λ+ 1)3
Under the standard assumptions of θ¯ = 1 and θ1 = 0.5 these expressions can be simplified
and are all larger than zero, such that the price curves are convex.
∂2pA2
∂λ2
= − 8
(λ− 3)3 > 0
∂2pA2,A
∂λ2
= − 4
(λ− 3)3 > 0
∂2pB2
∂λ2
= − 8
(λ− 3)3 > 0
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∂2pB2,B
∂λ2
= − 4
(λ− 3)3 > 0
Proof of Proposition 2
In the case where all consumers anonymize, beliefs about identified consumers are off-
equilibrium. Consistent off-equilibrium beliefs for example are that there are no consumers
on the upper Hotelling line in Figure 3, so that setting pi2,i, p
j
2,i ≥ pi2 is a best response. If
we assume that consumers put a positive probability on giving their cookies, we end up in a
situation we analyzed in the main body based on Figure 3. Consumers still have an incentive
to make sure to receive a lower price and therefore choose to anonymize with λ→ 1.
Since λ = 1, as was derived by the price comparison in the backward induction, the
two periods of the game are no longer dependent on each other. Therefore we can directly
calculate the prices for the second stage, by substituting λ = 1 into the set of prices derived
in Lemma 2. As can be derived from the limit case analysis, only the anonymous prices
of firms A and B are relevant now, since the loyalty prices are no longer contained in the
maximization problem. pA2 and pB2 both take the value θ¯ which corresponds to a uniform
pricing strategy. The profits for each firm in this period are θ¯2
2
.
When solving the maximization problem in the first period, where profits over both
periods are maximized, period 2 profit is only an additive constant. The first-order conditions
of the maximization problems give the following reaction functions:
pA1 (p
B
1 ) =
pB1 + θ¯
2
pB1 (p
A
1 ) =
pA1 + θ¯
2
which then give the final prices for period t = 1 of θ¯ for both firms. Substituting the derived
prices into the marginal customer of period 1, we get θ1 = θ¯2 , which shows that the complete
market is evenly split between the two firms.
Proof of Proposition 3
When solving the maximization of two firms’ overall profits, we get that
pA2 = p
B
2 =
2λ+ βλ+ 2− 2β
−2λ+ 5βλ+ 6− 6β θ¯
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pA2,B = p
B
2,A =
[
1
4− β +
1− β
4− β ·
2λ+ βλ+ 2− 2β
−2λ+ 5βλ+ 6− 6β
]
θ¯
pA2,A = p
B
2,B =
[
2
4− β +
2(1− β)
4− β ·
2λ+ βλ+ 2− 2β
−2λ+ 5βλ+ 6− 6β
]
θ¯
which shows that pi2 > p
j
2,i and pi2,i = 2p
j
2,i. Moreover, pi2 ≥ pi2,i is equivalent to λ(2− β)(4−
β) + 2β(5− β) ≥ 8. We look at the following three scenarios separately:
1. β = 1
Under such circumstance, λ(2−β)(4−β) + 2β(5−β) ≥ 8 holds for all λ, therefore pi2 ≥ pi2,i.
Together with the fact that pi2 > p
j
2,i, no one has an incentive to hide cookies, since the
anonymous price is the highest among all customized prices. Thus, all consumers give their
cookies and λ = 0. This matches with our complete information case, in which there is a
unique pooling equilibrium.
2. β = 0
This is the incomplete information case, in which no poaching price exists. λ(2−β)(4−β)+
2β(5− β) ≥ 8 holds if and only if 8λ ≥ 8, which means that if λ→ 1, pi2 → pi2,i 27. On the
other hand, if λ 6= 1, then pi2 < pi2,i, which shows that all consumers hide their cookies, in
order to face the lower anonymous price in the second stage. In the end, all consumers hide
cookies and λ = 1 is the unique pooling equilibrium in this scenario.
3. β ∈ (0, 1)
When β is in this range, we cannot directly compare the values between anonymous price pi2
and loyalty price pi2,i. Therefore we discuss two cases as follow:
If pi2 ≥ pi2,i, then we have λ(2− β)(4− β) + 2β(5− β) ≥ 8. In such a condition, everyone
should give cookies in order to get a lower price in the second stage, that is, λ = 0. Therefore,
2β(5− β) ≥ 8 should hold in this case. However, the weak inequality only holds for β = 1.
The contradiction proves that there is no pooling equilibrium in this case.
If pi2 < pi2,i, we first look at the consumers who are close to the center. Without loss of
generality, we focus on the consumer who is located an ε unit to the left of the center, where
ε is very small but strictly positive. Denote this location as θ 28, so they bought from firm
A in the first stage. If this consumer decides to reveal information, there is a probability β
that they are targeted in the second stage and then choose the lower cost 29 between pA2,A+ θ
and pB2,A + (θ¯− θ); and there is a probability 1− β that they are not targeted and determine
27Note that when λ = 1, pi2,i doesn’t exist. Under such circumstance all consumers hide their cookies,
thus there will be no loyalty price.
28We can also write his location as θ¯2 − ε.
29The total costs include the price of the product plus the transportation costs.
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the lower cost between pA2,A + θ and pB2 + (θ¯ − θ). On the other hand, if this consumer is
anonymous, the cost they face in the second stage is pA2 + θ30. Moreover, in this case we
have that pA2,A > pA2 = pB2 > pB2,A. Thus, since the differences between the transportation
costs are infinitesimal, if this consumer reveals information, they always buy from firm B
in the second stage, since both the poaching price and anonymous price offered by firm B
are lower than the loyalty price from firm A. Similarly, we can show that if they reveal
the information, the expected cost in the second stage is lower than that if the consumer is
anonymous 31. Therefore, this consumer chooses to give cookies in the first stage, in order
to get a lower expected cost in the second stage.
Using a similar method, we now check the consumers who are near the endpoints. Again,
without loss of generality, we take the consumer who is located just to the right of firm A
as an example and denote the location as θ′. If the consumer reveals information, there is
a probability β that they are targeted in the second stage and then choose the lower cost
between pA2,A+θ′ and pB2,A+(θ¯−θ′); and there is a probability 1−β that they are not targeted
and choose the lower cost between pA2,A + θ′ and pB2 + (θ¯ − θ′). On the other hand, if this
consumer keeps their privacy, the cost they face in the second stage is pA2 + θ′. Considering
that this consumer is located just to the right of firm A, the difference of transportation
costs between buying from firm A and firm B converges to θ¯. Then we can show that
pA2,A + θ
′ < pB2,A + (θ¯ − θ′) and pA2,A + θ′ < pB2 + (θ¯ − θ′)32, which means that if the consumer
at θ′ reveals information, they always buy from firm A in the second stage, resulting in the
expected cost of pA2,A + θ′. However, if the consumer hides the cookies, the cost in the second
period is pA2 + θ′, which is smaller than pA2,A + θ′ given that pA2 < pA2,A. Thus, this consumer
chooses to hide cookies in the first stage. Comparing the two situations mentioned above, we
show that the consumer close to the center would like to reveal cookies, while the one near
the endpoint would like to hide cookies. This contradicts our pooling assumption, where
all consumers have the same probability of choosing to anonymize. Therefore, there is no
pooling equilibrium under β ∈ (0, 1).
30Basically, the consumer should also compare the costs between pA2 + θ and pB2 + (θ¯ − θ). However,
considering that pA2 = pB2 , they choose to buy from firm A in the second stage.
31If this consumer gives cookies, the expected cost in the second stage is β
[
pB2,A + (θ¯ − θ)
]
+ (1 −
β)
[
pB2 + (θ¯ − θ)
]
. Otherwise, if the consumer is anonymous, the cost are pA2 + θ. Again, since differences
between the transportation costs are infinitesimal, if they give cookies, the expected cost is lower than if
they hide cookies, due to the fact that βpB2,A + (1− β)pB2 < pA2 .
32Since pA2,A > p
A
2 = p
B
2 > p
B
2,A and (θ¯ − θ′) − θ′ → θ¯, we just need to show that pA2,A − pB2,A < θ¯. From
the maximization problems, we get that pA2,A = 2p
B
2,A. Thus, we need to show that p
B
2,A < θ¯. Due to the fact
that (1−λ)(1−β) > 0, we can easily prove that pA2 = pB2 < θ¯. Given that pA2 = pB2 > pB2,A, we complete the
proof of pB2,A < θ¯.
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Instructions for the experiment
Market game - Incomplete information [Complete information]33
A market
Participants take the role of buyers or sellers and are active in a market with eight locations.
Two sellers sell the same good and are located on either end of the market. Six buyers are
located between the two sellers according to the following graphical depiction:
Seller
Location 1
Buyer
Location 2
Buyer
Location 3
Buyer
Location 4
Buyer
Location 5
Buyer
Location 6
Buyer
Location 7
Seller
Location 8
Buyers buy exactly one good in each of the two periods. Sellers choose prices p at the
beginning of each period. Prices must be integers between 0 and 10. Buyers pay the price
of a good and transport costs t according to their distance to the respective seller. Buyers
pay transport costs of one unit per field and have to move to the sellers’ location. Buyers
receive earnings according to the following earnings function:
Earnings = 15− p− t
At the beginning of the first period sellers choose an introductory price. Buyers choose one
seller and decide whether to allow cookies. At the beginning of the second period sellers
choose three prices: a loyalty price[, a poaching price] and a new customer price. The profit
of sellers in a market corresponds to the sold number of goods multiplied with their respective
price according to the following profit function:
Profit = p · n
33Here you find translated short versions of the instrutions for the experiment. Original instructions are
in German and can be made available upon request. Note that transportation costs in the instructions are
denoted by t which corresponds to θ in the main body.
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The following table depicts which buyer sees which price of the two sellers in the second
period, according to their initial purchasing decision and cookie choice.
Chosen seller
in first period
Allow use
of cookies
Price of
seller 1
Price of
seller 2
Seller 1 allow Loyalty price New customer price
Seller 1 don’t allow New customer price New customer price
Seller 2 allow New customer price Loyalty price
Seller 2 don’t allow New customer price New customer price
[Differences in the complete information treatment.]
Chosen seller
in first period
Allow use
of cookies
Price of
seller 1
Price of
seller 2
Seller 1 allow Loyalty price Poaching price
Seller 1 don’t allow New customer price New customer price
Seller 2 allow Poaching price Loyalty price
Seller 2 don’t allow New customer price New customer price
Procedure
At the beginning of the experiment each participant is assigned a role, which remains fixed
for the remainder of the experiment of 20 rounds in total. In each round there are two
markets with two sellers each. Six buyers are active in both markets, while sellers are active
in one of the markets. Within one round locations of buyers and sellers are fixed. Each
round buyers are assigned random new locations in both markets. Sellers are randomly
assigned to one market with a random location at either end of the market in each round.
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Privacy concern survey - IUIPC score34
All statements are rated by the subjects on a seven-point scale from “strongly agree” to
“strongly disagree”. The first three statements relate to control issues, statements four to six
relate to awareness and the remaining four statemtents relate to collection issues.
1) Consumer online privacy is really a matter of consumers’ right to exercise control and autonomy over
decisions about how their information is collected, used, and shared.
2) Consumer control of personal information lies at the heart of consumer privacy.
3) I believe that online privacy is invaded when control is lost or unwillingly reduced as a result of a
marketing transaction.
4) Companies seeking information online should disclose the way the data are collected, processed, and
used.
5) A good consumer online privacy policy should have a clear and conspicuous disclosure.
6) It is very important to me that I am aware and knowledgeable about how my personal information
will be used.
7) It usually bothers me when online companies ask me for personal information.
8) When online companies ask me for personal information, I sometimes think twice before providing it.
9) It bothers me to give personal information to so many online companies.
10) I’m concerned that online companies are collecting too much personal information about me.
Iterative thinking task - The game of 2235
The rules of the game are as follows: This is a two-player game in which players increase a counter. This
counter starts at 0 and ends at 22 and must be moved each turn by 1, 2 or 3 steps, with players acting
sequentially. You will play this game against the computer and you are the first to move. The player who
reaches 22 loses. If the computer loses the game, you will earn 2e , while you will earn 0e if you lose.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
Figure 10: Representation of the Game of 22
34Original questions of Malhotra et al. (2004) were translated to German.
35Instructions are originally in German and presented on screen.
44
References
Acquisti, A., John, L. K., and Loewenstein, G. (2013). What is privacy worth? The Journal of Legal Studies,
42(2):249–274.
Acquisti, A. and Varian, H. R. (2005). Conditioning prices on purchase history. Marketing Science, 24(3):367–
381.
Armstrong, M. (2006). Recent developments in the economics of price discrimination. Cambridge University
Press.
Barreda-Tarrazona, I., García-Gallego, A., Georgantzís, N., Andaluz-Funcia, J., and Gil-Sanz, A. (2011).
An experiment on spatial competition with endogenous pricing. International Journal of Industrial
Organization, 29(1):74–83.
Baye, I. and Sapi, G. (2014). Targeted pricing, consumer myopia and investment in customer-tracking
technology. Number 131. DICE Discussion Paper.
Beresford, A. R., Kübler, D., and Preibusch, S. (2012). Unwillingness to pay for privacy: A field experiment.
Economics letters, 117(1):25–27.
Brokesova, Z., Deck, C., and Peliova, J. (2014). Experimenting with purchase history based price discrimi-
nation. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 37:229–237.
Camacho-Cuena, E., García-Gallego, A., Georgantzís, N., and Sabater-Grande, G. (2005). Buyer–seller
interaction in experimental spatial markets. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 35(2):89–108.
Carroni, E. et al. (2015). Competitive behaviour-based price discrimination among asymmetric firms.
CERPE.
Casadesus-Masanell, R. and Hervas-Drane, A. (2015). Competing with privacy. Management Science,
61(1):229–246.
Chen, Y., Narasimhan, C., and Zhang, Z. J. (2001). Individual marketing with imperfect targetability.
Marketing Science, 20(1):23–41.
Chen, Y. and Pearcy, J. (2010). Dynamic pricing: when to entice brand switching and when to reward
consumer loyalty. The RAND Journal of Economics, 41(4):674–685.
Colombo, S. (2016). Imperfect behavior-based price discrimination. Journal of Economics & Management
Strategy, 25(3):563–583.
Conitzer, V., Taylor, C. R., and Wagman, L. (2012). Hide and seek: Costly consumer privacy in a market
with repeat purchases. Marketing Science, 31(2):277–292.
Dufwenberg, M., Sundaram, R., and Butler, D. J. (2010). Epiphany in the game of 21. Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization, 75(2):132–143.
Esteves, R.-B. (2014). Price discrimination with private and imperfect information. The Scandinavian
Journal of Economics, 116(3):766–796.
Esteves, R. B. et al. (2009). A survey on the economics of behaviour-based price discrimination. Technical
report, NIPE-Universidade do Minho.
Feri, F., Giannetti, C., and Jentzsch, N. (2016). Disclosure of personal information under risk of privacy
shocks. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 123:138–148.
45
Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J. (2000). Customer poaching and brand switching. RAND Journal of Economics,
pages 634–657.
Fudenberg, D. and Villas-Boas, J. M. (2006). Behavior-based price discrimination and customer recognition.
Handbook on economics and information systems, 1:377–436.
Gneezy, U., Rustichini, A., and Vostroknutov, A. (2010). Experience and insight in the race game. Journal
of economic behavior & organization, 75(2):144–155.
Hotelling, H. (1929). Stability in competition. The Economic Journal, 39(153):41–57.
Liu, Q. and Serfes, K. (2004). Quality of information and oligopolistic price discrimination. Journal of
Economics & Management Strategy, 13(4):671–702.
Mahmood, A. (2014). How do customer characteristics impact behavior-based price discrimination? an
experimental investigation. Journal of Strategic Marketing, 22(6):530–547.
Malhotra, N. K., Kim, S. S., and Agarwal, J. (2004). Internet users’ information privacy concerns (iuipc):
The construct, the scale, and a causal model. Information systems research, 15(4):336–355.
Montes, R., Sand-Zantman, W., and Valletti, T. (2018). The value of personal information in online markets
with endogenous privacy. Management Science.
Odlyzko, A. (2003). Privacy, economics, and price discrimination on the internet. In Proceedings of the 5th
international conference on Electronic commerce, pages 355–366. ACM.
Preibusch, S., Kübler, D., and Beresford, A. R. (2013). Price versus privacy: an experiment into the
competitive advantage of collecting less personal information. Electronic Commerce Research, 13(4):423–
455.
Schudy, S. and Utikal, V. (2017). You must not know about me–on the willingness to share personal data.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 141:1–13.
Shin, J. and Sudhir, K. (2010). A customer management dilemma: When is it profitable to reward one’s
own customers? Marketing Science, 29(4):671–689.
Streitfeld, D. (2000). On the web, price tags blur.
Taylor, C. R. (2004). Consumer privacy and the market for customer information. RAND Journal of
Economics, pages 631–650.
Tsai, J. Y., Egelman, S., Cranor, L., and Acquisti, A. (2011). The effect of online privacy information on
purchasing behavior: An experimental study. Information Systems Research, 22(2):254–268.
Tucker, C. E. (2012). The economics of advertising and privacy. International journal of Industrial
organization, 30(3):326–329.
46
